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ABSTRACT
Cyberbullying is a growing problem affecting more than half
of all American teens. The main goal of this paper is to in-
vestigate fundamentally new approaches to understand and
automatically detect and predict incidents of cyberbullying
in Instagram, a media-based mobile social network. In this
work, we have collected a sample data set consisting of In-
stagram images and their associated comments. We then de-
signed a labeling study and employed human contributors at
the crowd-sourced CrowdFlower website to label these me-
dia sessions for cyberbullying. A detailed analysis of the
labeled data is then presented, including a study of relation-
ships between cyberbullying and a host of features such as
cyberaggression, profanity, social graph features, temporal
commenting behavior, linguistic content, and image content.
Using the labeled data, we further design and evaluate the
performance of classifiers to automatically detect and pre-
dict incidents of cyberbullying and cyberaggression.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social And Behavioral Sciences]: Sociology; H.3.5
[Online Information Services]: Web-based Services
General Terms
Design, Human Factors, Measurement
Keywords
Cyberbullying; Online Social Networks; Instagram; Behav-
ioral Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
As online social networks (OSNs) have grown in popu-
larity, instances of cyberbullying in OSNs have become an
increasing concern. In fact more than half of American teens
have been the victims of cyberbullying [35]. Although cy-
berbullying may not cause any physical damage initially, it
has potentially devastating psychological effects like depres-
sion, low self-esteem, suicide ideation, and even suicide [7,
16, 13, 48] and can have long term effects in the future life
of victims [2]. Incidents of cyberbullying with extreme con-
sequences such as suicide are now routinely reported in the
popular press. For example cyberbullying of Jessica Logan
via her image shared in Facebook and MySpace and of Hope
Sitwell with her image shared in MySpace is attributed to
their suicides [5], [36]. Also, nine teenagers reportedly com-
mitted suicide having experienced cyberbullying in Ask.fm
[4]. Although cyberbullying is not the direct cause of these
suicides, it was viewed as a contributing factor in the death
of these teenagers [6].
Given the gravity of the consequences cyberbullying has
on its victims and its rapid spread among middle and high
school students, there is an immediate and pressing need for
research to understand how cyberbullying occurs in OSNs
today, so that effective techniques can be developed to ac-
curately detect cyberbullying. In [48], it is reported that
experts in the field of cyberbullying could favor automatic
monitoring of cyberbullying on social networking sites and
propose effective follow-up strategies.
Our work makes the important distinction between cy-
beraggression, which concerns the aggressiveness of a single
remark toward a user, and cyberbullying, which concerns the
overall pattern of aggressiveness of many remarks directed
at a user. It is this pattern of aggression that severely im-
pacts many teens. In fact, cyberbullying has been defined
as intentionally aggressive behavior that is repeatedly carried
out in an online context against a person who cannot easily
defend him or herself [26, 40]. It is important to this defini-
tion of cyberbullying that both the frequency of negativity
and the imbalance of power between the victim and perpe-
trator be taken into account. In contrast, cyberaggression is
defined as an instance of using digital media to intentionally
harm another person [26].
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Ask.fm, and Instagram have
been listed as the top five networks with the highest per-
centage of users reporting experience of cyberbullying [11].
Instagram is of particular interest as it is a media-based
mobile social network, which allows users to post and com-
ment on images. Cyberbullying in Instagram can happen
in different ways, including posting a humiliating image of
someone else by perhaps editing the image, posting mean or
hateful comments, aggressive captions or hashtags, or creat-
ing fake profiles pretending to be someone else [15]. Figure
1 illustrates an example of an attack in Instagram in which
hateful comments were posted for the profile owner.
The main goal of this paper is to first study cyberbullying
in Instagram and then develop classifiers to automatically
detect cyberbullying incidents and predict onset of cyberbul-
lying incidents. To do so, we first collected a large sample
of Instagram data comprised of 3,165K media sessions (im-
ages and their associated comments) taken from 25K user
profiles. Next, we designed and conducted a set of labeling
surveys using human labelers at the crowd-sourced Crowd-
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Figure 1: An example of comments posted on In-
stagram. To give more room for the text, we have
moved the associated image to overlay some of the
text.
Flower website to identify occurrences of cyberbullying and
cyberaggression in Instagram. We then analyzed the labeled
data set, reporting different features of these media sessions
with respect to cyberbullying. Finally, based on our analy-
sis, we have designed and evaluated classifiers for detecting
cyberbullying incidents and predicting onset of cyberbul-
lying incidents. This paper make the following important
contributions:
• We provide a clear distinction between cyberbullying
and general cyberaggression. Cyberbullying is a stricter
form of cyberaggression, while most of the earlier re-
search in this area has focused on identifying cyberag-
gression.
• We obtain ground truth about cyberbullying behavior
in Instagram by asking human crowd-sourcers to la-
bel Instagram images and their associated comments
according to both the more restrictive definition of cy-
berbullying and the more general definition of cyber-
aggression. Labelers are provided with the image and
its associated comments at the same time to be able
to understand the context and label accordingly.
• We present a novel detailed analysis of the labeled me-
dia sessions, including the relationships between cy-
berbullying and a host of factors, such as cyberaggres-
sion, profanity, social graph properties (liking, follow-
ers/following), the interarrival time of comments, the
linguistic content of comments, and labeled image con-
tent.
• We design and evaluate multi-modal classifiers that
extend beyond merely the text dimension for detect-
ing cyberbullying and further incorporate image-based
features and user statistics in the detection.
• Finally, we design and evaluate multi-modal classifiers
to predict cyberbullying based on the labeled data.
To the best of our knowledge, no other research has
addressed the problem of predicting cyberbullying in
social networks.
2. RELATEDWORKS
Prior works that investigated cyberbullying [43, 8, 22, 9,
14, 24, 51, 31, 29, 10, 30] are more accurately described as
research on cyberaggression, since these works do not take
into account both the frequency of aggression and the im-
balance of power. These works have largely applied a text
analysis approach to online comments, since this approach
results in higher precision and lower false positives than sim-
pler list-based matching of profane words [47]. Previous re-
search [33, 34, 24, 31] applied text based cyberbullying on
Formspring.me and Myspace dataset. Dinakar et al. investi-
gated both explicit and implicit cyberbullying by analyzing
negative text comments on YouTube and Formspring pro-
files [9]. Sanchez and Kumar proposed using a Naive Bayes
classifier to find inappropriate words in Twitter text data
for bullying detection [14]. They tracked potential bullies,
their followers, and the victims. Also some researchers tried
to detect bullies and victims by looking at the number of re-
ceived and sent, beside detecting aggressive comments [32]
and [30] . Dadvar et al. investigated how combining text
analysis with MySpace user profile information such as gen-
der can improve the accuracy of cyberbullying detection in
OSNs [8] . Huang et al. [20] has consider some graph proper-
ties besides text features, however they also worked only over
comment-based labeled data. Another work has looked at
the time series of posted comments of Formespring dataset,
which each question answer pair was labeled separately as
cyberaggression and predict their severity, [42]. Also much
of these works have considered text-based approach to an-
alyze comments in OSNs instead of analyzing the features
associated with the media objects such as images or videos
belonging to those comments. Kansara et al. [23] suggest
only a framework for using images beside text for detecting
cyberbullying.
Other work analyzed profanity usages in Instagram [19]
and Ask.fm [17] comments, but did not label the data at all.
Our previous work, [18] detects cyberbullyning incidents in
the Instagram for images with comments with more than
40% negativity. Additional research investigated aspects of
the Instagram social network, but not in the context of cy-
berbullying. For example, [50] explored users’ photo shar-
ing experience in a museum. Silva et al. [45] considered the
temporal photo sharing behavior of Instagram users and Hu
et al. [52] categorized Instagram images into eight popular
image categories and the Instagram users into five types in
terms of their posted images. By investigating user prac-
tices in Instagram, [3] concluded that users tend to be more
active during weekends and at the end of the day. They also
found out that users are more likely to like and comment on
the medias that are already popular, thereby inducing the
rich get richer phenomenon.
3. DATA COLLECTION
Starting from a random seed node, we identified 41K In-
stagram user ids using a snowball sampling method from
the Instagram API. Among these Instagram ids, 25K (61%)
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users had public profiles while the rest had private profiles.
Due to the limitation on the private profiles’ lack of shared
information, the 25K public user profiles comprise our sam-
ple data set. For each public Instagram user, the collected
profile data includes the media objects (videos/images) that
the user has posted and their associated comments, user id
of each user followed by this user, user id of each user who
follows this user, and user id of each user who commented on
or liked the media objects shared by the user. We consider
each media object plus its associated comments as a media
session.
Labeling data is a costly process and therefore in order
to make the labeling of cyberbullying more manageable, we
sought to label a smaller subset of these media sessions. To
have a higher rate of cyberbullying instances, we considered
media sessions with at least one profanity word in their asso-
ciated comments. We tag a comment as “negative” using an
approach similar to [17]. For this set of 25K users, 3,165K
unique media sessions were collected, where 697K of these
sessions have at least one profane word in their comments
by users other than the profile owner, where a profane word
is obtained from a dictionary [37], [49].
In addition, we needed media sessions with enough com-
ments so that labelers could adequately assess the frequency
or repetition of aggression, which is an important part of the
cyberbullying definition. We selected a threshold of 15 as
a lower bound on the number of comments in a media ses-
sion, considering that the average ratio of comments posted
by users other than friends to comments posted by the pro-
file owner in an Instagram profile is around 16 [19]. At the
end 2,218 media sessions (images and their associated com-
ments) were selected randomly for the task of labeling.
4. CYBERBULLYING LABELING
In this section, we explain the design and methodology
for our survey for labeling the selected set of media ses-
sions. Our first challenge is choosing appropriate definitions
of terms, which will then be used in ground truth labeling.
Based on the literature, a major early choice that we have
made is to distinguish between cyberaggression and cyber-
bullying. Cyberaggression is broadly defined as any occur-
rence of using digital media to intentionally harm another
person [26] . Examples include negative content and words
such as profanity, slang and abbreviations that would be
used in negative posts such as hate, fight, wtf. Cyberbully-
ing is one form of cyberaggression that is more restrictively
defined as intentional aggression that is repeatedly carried
out in an electronic context against a person who cannot
easily defend him or herself [26, 40]. Thus, cyberbullying
consists of three main features : (1) an act of aggression
online; (2) an imbalance of power between the individuals
involved; and (3) it is repeated over time [21, 26, 38, 39, 46].
The power imbalance can take on a variety of forms includ-
ing physical, social, relational or psychological [12, 28, 39,
44], such as a user being more technologically savvy than
another [25], a group of users targeting one user, or a pop-
ular user targeting a less popular one [27]. Repetition of
cyberbullying can occur over time or by forwarding/sharing
a negative comment or photo with multiple individuals [27].
In Instagram, each media session consists of a media ob-
ject posted by the profile owner and the corresponding com-
ments for the media object. The goal in this paper is to
investigate cyberaggression and cyberbullying in this multi-
modal context (textual comments and media objects). Our
labeling process consisted of two separate surveys. The first
survey incorporates both the image and the associated text
comments when asking the human contributors whether the
media session was an instance of cyberbullying or cyberag-
gression. The second survey is focused on the image contents
alone and is used to identify the content and category of the
image.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of our design for the first
labeling survey. On the left is the image, and on the right
is a scrollable interface to help the contributor see all of the
comments associated with this image. With input from a so-
cial science expert, we designed a simple survey that asked
the contributors two questions, namely whether the media
session constituted cyberaggression or not, and whether the
media session constituted cyberbullying or not. During the
instructional phase prior to labeling, contributors were given
the aforementioned definitions of cyberaggression and cyber-
bullying along with related examples. Each media session
was labeled by five contributors.
Figure 2: An example of the labeling survey, show-
ing an image and its corresponding comments, and
the survey questions.
4.1 Quality Control
In order to provide quality control, we only permitted the
highest-rated contributors on CrowdFlower to have access
to our job. Next, a mentoring phase was provided for the
potential contributors that included instructions and a set
of example media sessions with the correct label. Further,
to monitor the quality of the contributors and filter out the
spammers, potential contributors were asked to answer a
set of test questions in two phases: quiz mode and work
mode. Potential contributors needed to answer correctly a
minimum number of test questions to pass the quiz mode
and qualify as a contributor for the survey. We also incor-
porated quality control checks during the labeling process
(work mode) by inserting random test questions. A contrib-
utor was filtered out if he/she failed this work mode. Finally,
a minimum time threshold was set to filter out contributors
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who rushed too quickly through the labeling process. The
minimum number of test questions to get back high-quality
data was recommended by CrowdFlower.
Overall, 176 potential contributors worked on the quiz
questions, 144 passed the quiz mode, while 31 contributors
failed and 1 gave up. The labeled data that we finally ob-
tained were from 139 trusted contributors, while the the rest
were filtered out during the work mode. Table 1 provides the
number of trusted judgments and the contributors’ accuracy
for 11,090 total judgments.
Table 1: Labeling process statistics. Trusted judg-
ments are the ones made by trusted contributors.
Trusted Judgments 10987
Untrusted Judgments 103
Average Test Question Accuracy of
Trusted Contributors
89%
Labeled Media Sessions per Hour 6
4.2 Image Labeling
Next, we conducted a second separate survey just to label
the image contents of media sessions, so that we could in-
vestigate the relationship between cyberbullying and image
content. We first sampled 1,200 images from the selected
subset of media sessions to determine a suitable set of rep-
resentative categories to be used in the labeling. A grad-
uate student examined all the images and classified them
to different possible categories. Then for designing the sur-
vey, a social science expert checked the categories again and
revised them. Some of the dominant categories identified
were the presence of a human in the image, as well as text,
clothes, tattoos, sports and celebrities. We then asked con-
tributors to identify which of the aforementioned categories
were present in the image. Multiple categories could be se-
lected for a given image. Each media session was labeled by
three different contributors.
At the end, our social science expert checked a set of
random media sessions and images to confirm the quality of
the labeled data for both surveys.
5. ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERIZATION
OF GROUND TRUTH DATA
We submitted our first survey with 2,218 media sessions
(images and their associated comments) to CrowdFlower,
a crowd-sourced website. Each media session was labeled
by five different contributors. CrowdFlower provides a de-
gree of trust for each contributor based on the percent-
age of correctly answered test questions explain in section
4. This trust value is incorporated by CrowdFlower into
a weighted version of the majority voting method called a
“confidence level” for each labeled media session. We de-
cided to keep media sessions whose weighted trust-based
metric was equal to or greater than 60%. We deemed them
to be strong enough support for majority voting from con-
tributor with higher trust. Overall, 1,954 (88%) of the orig-
inal pure majority-vote based media sessions wound up in
this higher-confidence cyberbullying-labeled group. For this
higher-confidence data set, 29% of the media sessions be-
longed to the “bullying” group while the other 71% were
deemed to be not bullying.
5.1 Labeling and Negativity Analysis
Distribution of the media sessions based on the num-
ber of votes (out of five votes) received for cyberaggression
and cyberbullying respectively has been provided in Fig-
ure 3. The left chart shows the fraction of samples that
have been labeled as cyberaggression k times, and the right
chart shows the fraction of samples that have been labeled
as cyberbullying k times. Higher the number of votes for
a given media session, more confidence we have that the
media session contains an incident of cyberaggression or cy-
berbullying, with five votes means unanimous agreement.
Similarly, lower the number of votes for a given media ses-
sion, more confidence we have that the media session does
not contain an incident of cyberaggression or cyberbullying,
with zero votes means unanimous agreement.The inter-rater
agreement Fleiss-Kappa value for cyberbullying is 0.5 and
for cyberaggression is 0.52.
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Figure 3: Fraction of media sessions that have been
voted k times as cyberaggression (left) or cyberbul-
lying (right).
We notice that for both cyberaggression and cyberbully-
ing, most of the probability mass is around media sessions
labeled by all four or five contributors the same, i.e. either
0 or 1 votes (about 50% for cyberaggression and about 62%
for cyberbullying), or 4 or 5 votes (about 31% for cyber-
aggression and about 23% for cyberbullying). Thus, a key
finding is that the contributors are mostly in agreement about
what behavior constitutes cyberaggression, and what behavior
constitutes cyberbullying in Instagram media sessions. Only
about 13−17% of the media sessions have two or three votes,
which indicates that there is some disagreement in a small
fraction of media sessions about whether the session con-
tains an incident of cyberaggression or cyberbullying. This
disagreement can be attributed to the fact that different
people have different levels of sensitivity and a conversation
may seem normal to one person and hurtful to another.
Next, we observe that about 30% of the media sessions
have not been labeled as cyberaggression by any of the five
contributors. Since all media sessions contained at least one
comment with one or more profane word, this suggests that
only employing a profanity usage threshold to detect cyber-
aggression can produce many false positives. We make a
similar observation for cyberbullying. We notice about 40%
4
of the media sessions have not been labeled as cyberbullying
by any of the five contributors. Applying a majority voting
criterion to a binary label as cyberbullying or not, 30% of
the samples have been labeled as cyberbullying. This is de-
spite the fact that all the media sessions contain at least
one profane word. This leads us to our second important
finding. A classifier design for cyberbullying detection can-
not solely rely on the usage of profanity among the words
in image-based discussions, and instead must consider other
features to improve accuracy.
Figure 4: Two-dimensional distribution of media
sessions as a function of the number of votes given
for cyberaggression versus the number of votes given
for cyberbullying, assuming five labelers.
In order to understand the relationship between cyberag-
gression and cyberbullying, we plotted in Figure 4 a two-
dimensional heat map that shows the distribution of me-
dia sessions as a function of the number of votes each me-
dia session received for cyberaggression and cyberbullying.
We observe that a significant fraction of the sessions exhibit
strong agreement in terms of either receiving high numbers
of votes for both cyberbullying and cyberaggressions, or re-
ceiving low numbers of votes for both cyberbullying and
cyberaggression. This can be inferred from the high energy
in the upper right and lower left part of the diagonal. In
addition, it is promising that the area below the diagonal is
essentially zero, meaning no session has received more votes
for cyberbullying than for cyberaggression. This conforms
with the definition that cyberbullying is a subset of cyberag-
gression. The Pearson’s correlation between number of vote
for cyberbullying and number of votes for cyberaggression
is 0.9.
We see that the remaining significant energy in the dis-
tribution appears in the area above the diagonal. Media
sessions in this area exhibit the property that if they receive
N1 cyberbullying votes and N2 cyberaggression votes, then
N2 ≥ N1. The area where N1 ≤ 2 and N2 ≥ 3 corresponds
to cases where there is cyberaggression but not cyberbul-
lying. These observations lead us to our third important
finding. A media session that exhibits cyberaggression does
not necessarily exhibit cyberbullying, and a classifier design
for cyberbullying detection must go much beyond merely de-
tecting cyberaggression. This is a very important finding,
because as we noted in Section 2, prior work on detecting
cyberbullying has mainly focused on detecting cyberaggres-
sion as they do not take into account the frequency of ag-
gression or imbalance of power, which are crucial features of
cyberbullying.
Finally, we are interested in understanding the relation
between cyberbullying/cyberaggression and the percentage
of negativity in the comments. We divided all the media
sessions into nine different bins based on the percentage of
negativity in their comments. Bin (n1−n2] contains all me-
dia sessions with bigger than n1% and smaller than or equal
to n2% negativity. None of the media sessions contained
more than 90% negative comments. Next, we calculated per-
centage media sessions for each bin that can be identified as
cyberaggression or cyberbullying based on majority of votes,
i.e. where the number of votes is 3 or higher. Figure 5 shows
these fractions, left figure for cyberaggression and right fig-
ure for cyberbullying. We observe that as the percentage of
negativity increases, so does the fraction of media sessions
up until 50% negativity for cyberaggression and 60% for cy-
berbullying. This increase is as expected, since cyberaggres-
sion or cyberbullying is typically accompanied with negativ-
ity in the postings. However, we notice that the percentage
of cyberaggression or cyberbullying starts decreasing after
these peaks as the percentage of negativity increases. This
is quite an unexpected result and seems counter-intuitive.
To understand this, we examined closely the media sessions
that have very high negativity. We noticed that these media
sessions typically involved discussions about sports, politics,
tattoos, or were just friendly talks. People tend to use lots
of profanity words in such discussion, even though they are
not insulting any one person in particular. This leads us
to our final important finding about negativity analysis. A
media sessions with a significantly high percentage of nega-
tivity (more than 60-70%) typically implies a low probability
that the session contains a cyberbullying incident.
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Figure 5: Percentage of media sessions that have
been labeled as cyberaggression (left) and cyberbul-
lying (right) versus their negativity percentages.
5.2 Temporal and Graph Properties Analysis
Since different comments in a media session are posted
at different times, it is important to understand the rela-
tionship between the temporal nature of comment postings
and cyberbullying/cyberaggression. We define the strength
of cyberbullying/cyberaggression as the number of votes re-
ceived for labeling a media session as cyberbullying/cyber-
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aggression, and explore the Pearson’s correlation of cyber-
bullying/cyberaggression strength and temporal behavior
comment arrivals. We would like to understand how hu-
man contributors incorporated the definition of cyberbul-
lying, which includes the temporal notion of repetition of
negativity over time, into their labeling. Given the time
stamps on the collected comment, we compute the inter-
arrival time between two consequent comments. We then
count the number of interarrival times of comments in a
media session that have a value less than x = 1min, 5 min,
...,6 months.
Figure 6 illustrates the correlation between the number
votes and the number of comments arrive with less than
or equal x seconds after their previously received comment.
We see that there is a correlation of about 0.3 between the
strength of support for cyberbullying and media sessions in
which there are frequent postings within one hour of previ-
ous post. Further, we find that as we expand the allowable
interarrival times between comments, the correlation weak-
ens considerably. Similar pattern was observed for cyberag-
gression. In fact, on average around 40% of the comments
arrive in less than 1 hours after previously received com-
ment in cyberbullying media sessions, however only 30% of
the comments have been received with the same interarrival
time in non-cyberbullying samples (p < 0.001, based on t-
test). A key finding here is that media sessions that contain
cyberbullying have relatively low comment interarrival times,
that is the comments in these media sessions are posted quite
frequently.
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Figure 6: Pearson’s correlation between the number
of votes and the number of comments arrive with
less than or equal x seconds after their previously
received comment. (X-axis has been converted to
coarser time units than second)
Next, we examine the relationship between cyberbully-
ing/cyberaggression and the social network graph features
such as the number of likes for a given media object, num-
ber of comments posted for a media object, number of users
a user is following, and the number of followers of a user. Ta-
ble 2 shows these numbers, for categories of non-cyberbullying
sessions, cyberbullying sessions, non-cyberaggression sessions
and cyberaggression sessions. We observe that media ses-
sions that contain cyberbullying/cyberaggression share more
media objects than media sessions that do not contain cy-
berbullying/cyberaggression, but on average receive lower
number of likes. Souza et al.’s [3] analysis of Instagram
users shows there is a positive correlation between num-
ber of followers and number of likes for typical Instagram
users. Users who receive cyberbullying do not follow the
same pattern. In fact, the average number of likes per post
for non-cyberbullying sessions is 4 times the average num-
ber of likes for cyberbullying sessions, and the the average
number of likes per post for non-cyberaggression sessions
is 4.5 times the average number of likes for cyberaggres-
sion sessions. In terms of number of following and followers,
the distinction is not as pronounced, although we see that
the media sessions with cyberbullying/cyberaggression in-
cidents have more followers and less following compared to
the media sessions without cyberaggression/cyberbullying.
The key finding here is that the users of media sessions with
cyberbullying/cyberaggression have lower number of likes per
post while have more followers.
5.3 Linguistic and Psychological Analysis
We now focus on the pattern of linguistic and psycholog-
ical measurements of cyberbullying/cyberaggression media
sessions versus non-cyberbullying/non-cyberaggression. For
this purpose, we have applied Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) a text analysis program to find which cate-
gories of words have been used for cyberbullying/cyberaggre-
ssion labeled media sessions. LIWC evaluates different as-
pects of word usages in psychologically meaningful cate-
gories, by counting the number of the words across the text
for each category [41]. LIWC has often been used for studies
on variations in language use across different people. Pub-
lished papers show that LIWC have been validated to per-
form well in studies on variations in language use across
different peoples [1]. We first analyze the number of words,
and usage of pronouns, negations and swear words (Fig-
ure 7). Next, we look at some of the personal concerns such
as work, achievements, leisure, etc. (Figure 8). Finally,
we investigate some of the psychological measurements such
as social, family, friends, etc. (Figure 9). For each of these
cases, we first obtain the LIWC values for each media session
comment set. We then calculate the average LIWC value
for each of the four classes: media sessions with cyberbul-
lying, media sessions with no cyberbullying, media sessions
with cyberaggression, and media sessions with no cyberag-
gression. The bars shown in Figures 7-9 represent the ratio
of average LIWC value for cyberbullying class to that of
non-cyberbullying, and the ratio of average LIWC value for
cyberaggression class to that of non-cyberaggression.
In Figure 7, we first notice that the word count for me-
dia sessions with cyberbullying/cyberaggression is signifi-
cantly higher than for media sessions with no cyberbully-
ing/cyberaggression (p < 10−5). Next, as expected, for
swear words (e.g., damn, piss) and negations (e.g., never,
not), the ratio is higher for cyberbullying/cyberaggression
category (p < 10−5). It is interesting to note that the ratios
for the third person pronouns (she, he, they) are more than
1.3 (p < 10−5), ratio for the first person singular pronoun (
i ) is 0.85, and the ratios for first person plural and second
person pronouns (we, you) is closer to 1. This leads us to
our first key finding with respect to the linguistic features.
A user is less likely to directly refer to himself/herself and
more likely to refer to other people in third person in postings
involving cyberbullying or cyberaggression.
For personal concerns (Figure 8), “religion” (e.g., church,
mosque) and “death” (e.g., bury, kill) categories have higher
ratios (more than 1.2, p < 0.1). This is in line with our
findings in our previous work on profanity usage analysis in
ask.fm social media, where we observed that there is high
6
Table 2: Mean values of social graph properties for cyberbullying versus non-cyberbullying samples and
aggression versus non-cyberaggression. (∗p < 0.05).
Label *Likes *Media objects Following Followers
Non-cyberbullying 9,684.4 1,145.7 668.1 415,676.2
Cyberbullying 7,029.0 1,198.3 626.7 463,073.1
Non-cyberaggression 9,768.6 1,133.7 665.9 421,075.3
Cyberaggression 7,551.3 1,204.3 640.3 440,403.6
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Figure 7: Ratio of LIWC values of cyberbully-
ing/cyberaggression labeled media sessions to non-
cyberbullying/non-cyberaggression class in Linguis-
tic categories.
profanity usage around words like “muslim” [17]. This con-
firms that religion-based cyberbullying is quite prevalent in
social media. On the other hand, ratios for personal cate-
gories like “work”, “money” and ‘achieve” are much closer
to 1.
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Figure 8: Ratio of LIWC values of cyberbully-
ing/cyberaggression labeled media sessions to non-
cyberbullying/non-cyberaggression class in Per-
sonal Concerns categories.
For psychological measurements (Figure 9), we notice that
the ratios for “negative emotion”, “anger”, “body”, and
“sexual” categories are significantly higher than 1 (more
than 1.4, p < 10−5), and the ratio for “positive emotion”
category is significantly lower than 1 (0.76, p < 10−5).
Higher ratios for “body” (e.g. face, wear) and “sexual” (e.g.
slut, rapist) categories provide evidence for appearance-based
and sexual-based cyberbullying in social media. For other
psychological measurement categories, such as “social”, “friend”,
etc., the ratios are closer to 1. Based on our observations
from Figures 8 and 9, our final important finding with re-
spect to linguistic features is as follows: There is a higher
probability of cyberbullying in postings involving religion, death,
appearance and sexual hints, and cyberbullying posts typi-
cally have higher occurrences of negative emotions and lower
occurrences of positive emotions.
5.4 Image Content Analysis
We now explore the relationship between image content
and cyberbullying/cyberaggression in a media session. Re-
call that contributors could place an image in more than
one category. More than 70% of the images were labeled
with only one category, and around 20% were labeled with
two categories. However, there were few images that were
labeled with up to eight unique categories. Figure 10 shows
the distribution of the number of contents which have been
assigned to the images by CrowdFlower contributors. We
used majority mechanism to decide on a single content cat-
egory for each image. In case of a tie, a graduate student
looked at those images to break the tie.
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Figure 10: Distribution of number of unique con-
tents assigned to each image in multichoice labeling.
Figure 11 shows the fraction of the contents for all la-
beled data in green bar. The blue and red bars embedded
inside each green bar in this figure indicate the fraction of
images that belonged to the media sessions that can be cate-
gorized as containing cyberaggression and cyberbullying re-
spectively. The “dont know” choice was given as we realized
that for some images it is hard to figure out what is in the
image. As some images belong to more than one category,
the bars will sum up to more than one.
First, we observe that the most common labels for image
content are Person/People, Text and Sports. Second, we
observe that for some content categories such as “Drugs”,
the fraction is quite small, but most of the images in those
categories do belong to media sessions with cyberaggres-
sion/cyberbullying in them. To understand this further, in
Figure 12, we show the fraction of images labeled as cyberag-
gression/cyberbullying for each content category. We notice
that for content category “Drugs”, 75% of the images belong
to media sessions containing cyberbullying, while for con-
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Figure 9: Ratio of LIWC values of cyberbullying/cyberaggression labeled media sessions to non-
cyberbullying/non-cyberaggression class in Psychological categories.
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Figure 11: Fraction of image categories for all media sessions, cyberbullying and cyberaggression classes.
tent categories like “Car”, “Nature”, “Person”, “Celebrity”,
“Text” and “Sport”, 30%-40% of the images belong to media
sessions containing cyberbullying/cyberaggression. Also, when-
ever images contain bike, food, tattoo, etc., there is little cy-
berbullying occurring. The key finding here is that certain
image contents such as Drug are highly correlated with cy-
berbulllying, while some other image contents such as bike,
food, etc. have a very low correlation with cyberbullying.
6. CYBERBULLYING DETECTION
Based on the labeled ground truth data, we next proceed
to detect occurrences of cyberbullying in Instagram media
sessions. A majority vote criterion was employed to deter-
mine whether a media session was cyberbullying/cyberagg-
ression or not. To design and train the classifier, five-fold
cross-validation was applied to the data such that 80% of the
data was used for training in each run and 20% was used for
testing, where we report the average. To achieve a balanced
training data set, we over-sampled the minority class of data
labeled as cyberbullying (29% cyberbullying class).
Based on our analysis in Section 5, we evaluated three
types of features, namely those features obtained from the
content of comments, those derived from shared media ob-
jects, and those obtained from user graph properties of the
profile owner, such as the number of followers or follow-
ings. For the text features, we removed characters such as
“!”, “>”, etc, as a preprocessing step. We first focused on
unigrams and bigrams. LIWC categories are derived from
unigrams and hence implicitly included as part of this text
analysis. Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) was employed
to reduce the dimensionality of the text analysis, prevent
over-fitting and extract the semantics as the features. LSA
based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) was applied
over the unigrams and bigrams. Next, removing stop words
such as “and”,“or”,“for”, etc. was employed, which proved
beneficial. Finally, each feature vector was normalized such
that its components sum to one.
Table 3 illustrates the performance results for different
features and classifiers. As we see, linear SVM classifiers
based on text-based N-grams with normalization and stop
words removal achieve the highest recall (79%), with pre-
cision 71%. Other classifiers were also employed, such as
logistic regression, decision tree and AdaBoost, but they did
not achieve better results.
In addition, a variety of non-text features were evaluated,
including those features extracted from user behavior (me-
dia objects, following, followers), media properties (likes,
post time, caption) and image content. For example, by
feeding user graph properties, media statistics and image
content to a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier, a precision of 48% and
recall of 60% was achieved. Adding non-text features to
the text features for SVM or logistic regression classifiers
provided approximately the same results. Our conclusion
is that the non-text features that we used were not able to
meaningfully improve the performance of the cyberbullying
detection classifier compared to the text-based features. This
conclusion is consistent with our earlier analysis from Sec-
tion 5.3, in which we observed the p-values were small for
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Figure 12: Fraction of images which have been labeled as cyberbullying and cyberaggression for each content
category.
text-based features, which shows that there was significant
differentiation between cyberbullying and non-cyberbullying
cases whereas the non-text features in cybebullying and non-
cyberbullying samples were not different significantly.
We also applied the same set of features for detecting
cyberaggression in Instagram media sessions (38% cyberag-
gression). The results are very similar to the cyberbullying
classifier. Table 4 shows that both linear SVM and logistic
regression provide the same F-1 measure, with recall of 80%
and precision of 74% with a logistic regression classifier.
7. CYBERBULLYING PREDICTION
Our next goal is to predict whether cyberbullying will oc-
cur at the time an image is posted on Instagram, without
benefit of using any subsequent comments in the media ses-
sion, as we had in the cyberbullying detection. That means
our prediction is based only on the initial posting of the me-
dia object, any image features derived from the object, and
any properties extant at the time of posting, such as graph
features of the profile owner.
To perform the prediction accurately, we need to augment
our previous set of labeled media sessions, which were pre-
filtered based on text analysis to contain only those with
profanity, to also include media sessions lacking in profan-
ity. This will create a labeled data set that is independent of
the content of text comments, namely profanity, and hence
usable for prediction, which will not have access to comment
contents. Therefore, we randomly selected 1164 media ses-
sions from the ones with no profanity usage with the criteria
of having more than 15 comments and labeled the new set
by the same methodology as before. In total 80 contribu-
tors worked on the quiz mode, 68 passed, 11 failed and 1
gave up. Labeled data was obtained from 59 trusted label-
ers as 9 labelers were further filtered out during the labeling
process, because they either failed the work mode or rushed
through their labeling process. We also labeled the image
contents of the new set of media sessions. Table 5 shows
the statistics related to this labeling process. Furthermore,
suing the same methodology that we used of cyberbullying
detection case, we only consider the media sessions whose
labeling had a confidence level more than 60%. Overall, this
gave us 1,142 labeled media sessions.
Table 6 shows the user social graph measurements for the
labeled media sessions. We observe that p-values are all less
than 0.1 for followers and following, which was not the case
Table 5: Labeling process statistics. Trusted judg-
ments are the ones made by trusted contributors.
Trusted Judgments 5,638
Untrusted Judgments 72
Average Test Question Accuracy of
Trusted Contributors
82%
Labeled Media Sessions per Hour 8
for the same features in Table 2. This suggests that these
features will be more helpful in prediction of cyberbullying
than in detection.
Table 6: Mean values of social graph properties for
cyberbullying versus non-cyberbullying samples and
cyberaggression versus non cyberaggression, (∗∗p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1).
Label *Media
objects
*Following Followers
Non-cyberbullying 1,157.8 721.7 **398,283.7
Cyberbullying 1,198.3 626.5 **465,376.1
Non-cyberaggression 1,152.6 724.4 *393,901.6
Cyberaggression 1,204.3 640.3 *440,403.6
The examined features include image contents, media ses-
sion properties, such as post time and caption, and profile
owner social graph properties, such as the number of fol-
lowers and following and total number of shared media ob-
jects. A similar methodology as the detection was applied
for training and testing of the predictor for a total 3,096
media sessions (18% cyberbullying class). Table 7 shows
that cyberbullying incidents can be predicted with recall 76%
and precision 62%, using only the image contents, media
and user meta data based on a Maximum-Entropy (MaxEnt)
classifier. For this augmented complete data set, we observe
that these non-text features provide the main utility for pre-
diction, whereas in detection, the main utility is derived from
text-based features over the profanity-based filtered data set.
In addition, we were interested to explore if prediction
could be improved using only a limited set of early com-
ments, not the complete set of comments for a media ses-
sion. Hence we also give in Table 7 the results of predic-
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Table 3: Cyberbullying detection’s classifier performance
Features Classifier F1-measure Precision Recall
Unigram-stopword removal linear SVM 0.74 0.70 0.79
Unigram -Bigram- stop word removal linear SVM 0.75 0.77 0.73
Unigram -Bigram-stop word removal-Normalization linear SVM 0.75 0.71 0.79
Unigram -Bigram-stop word removal-Normalization logistic regression 0.74 0.72 0.75
Table 4: Cyberaggression detection’s classifier performance
Features Classifier F1-measure Precision Recall
Unigram -Bigram-stop word removal-Normalization linear SVM 0.77 0.75 0.79
Unigram -Bigram-stop word removal-Normalization logistic regression 0.77 0.74 0.80
tion using the first 5, 10 and 15 comments. We see that
as more comments arrive, our predictor is able to improve
its precision and recall to 72% and 77% respectively using
a MaxEnt classifier. This suggests that text-based features
can improve classifier performance. We hope to leverage this
observation in future work to improve predictor performance
by utilizing the history of comments from other previously
shared media sessions in the prediction.
Table 8 provides the results for prediction of cyberaggres-
sion media sessions. The F1-measure is 6-9% lower than for
cyberbullying prediction using a MaxEnt classifier, due to
significantly lower recall.
8. FUTUREWORK
While this paper has advanced the understanding of cy-
berbullying in a media-based mobile social network, there
remain a number of areas for improvement. One theme for
future work is to improve the performance of our classifier.
New algorithms should be considered, such as deep learning
and neural networks. More input features should be evalu-
ated, such as new image features, mobile sensor data, etc. A
limitation of our current classifier is that it is designed only
for media sessions that have at least one profanity word.
A more general classifier that can apply to all media ses-
sions is needed. Incorporating image features needs to be
automated by applying image recognition algorithms. Tem-
poral behavior of comments for a posted media object shows
different behavior for cyberbullying class, which should be
taken into account in designing the detection classifier.
In this work we have only considered the image content
and image and user metadata for prediction of cyberbully-
ing. However, based on the improvement seen in using a
small number of text comments, we think that considering
the commenting history of users in previously shared media
can prove to be useful.
Another theme for future work is to obtain greater detail
from the labeling surveys. Our experience was that stream-
lining the survey improved the response rate, quality and
speed. However, we desire more detailed labeling, such as
for different roles in cyberbullying – identifying and differ-
entiating the role of a victim’s defender, who may also spew
negativity, from a victim’s bully or bullies.
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes the following major contributions: (1)
an appropriate definition of cyberbullying that incorporates
both frequency of negativity and imbalance of power ap-
plied in large-scale labeling, and is differentiated from cy-
beraggression; (2) cyberbullying is studied in the context
of a media-based social network, incorporating both images
and comments in the labeling; (3) a detailed analysis of the
distribution results of labeling of cyberbullying incidents is
presented, including a correlation analysis of cyberbullying
with other factors derived from images, text comments, and
social network meta data; (4) multi-modal classification re-
sults are presented for cyberbullying detection as well as
prediction that incorporate a variety of features to identify
cyberbullying incidents.
The major findings of this paper comprise the following
results. First, we found that labelers are mostly in agree-
ment about what constitutes cyberbullying and cyberag-
gression in Instagram media sessions. Second, we found a
significant number of media sessions containing profanity
and cyberaggression that were not labeled as cyberbullying,
suggesting that classifiers for cyberbullying must be more
sophisticated than mere profanity detection. Third, media
sessions with very high percentage of negativity above 60-
70% actually correspond to a lower likelihood of cyberbully-
ing. Fourth, media sessions with cyberbullying exhibit more
frequent commenting. Fifth, users of media sessions contain-
ing cyberbullying demonstrate a lower number of likes per
post. Sixth, cyberbullying has a higher probability of oc-
curring when media sessions contain certain linguistic cat-
egories such as death, appearance, religion and sexuality
content. Seventh, certain image contents such as “drug” are
highly related to cyberbullying while other image categories
such as “tattoo” or “food” are not. Eighth, a linear SVM
classifier can detect cyberbullying with 79% recall and 71%
precision using only text features, where non-text features
were not helpful. Ninth, however, non-text features such as
image and user meta data were central to cyberbullying pre-
diction, where a MaxEnt classifier achieved 76% recall and
62% precision.
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